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Memorandum for the File 
Subject: 80-2416, Florida v. Royer 
This is the Florida "airport search case" that we were 
uncertain about taking, and after reading the briefs I rather 
think it may have been a mistake to grant it. 
In brief summary, the facts (as stated in the en bane 
opinion of the Florida Court of Appeals) were as follows: 
Two State Narcotics Officers (Johnson and one other) spotted 
respondent in the Miami airport, and made the following 
observations: 
Johnson said that these were the facts that 
(a) the defendant was carrying American Tourister 
baggage of a type which "seemed to be standard brand 
for marijuana smuggling;" (b) he was "nervous in 
appearance, looking around at other persons as though 
he might be looking for possible police officers;" 
(c) he paid for the ticket to New York in cash (and 
therefore without the necessity of showing identifi-
cation from a roll of small-denomination bills; and 
(d) rather than filling out a full name, address, and 
phone number on the baggage tags furnished by National, 
he wrote only the words "Holt" and LaGuardia" on each 
of them. 
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As the State prevailed in the trial court, the Court of 
Appeals accepted Johnson's view of the facts. The agents 
believed that respondent's conduct was consistent with the 
"drug courier profile", developed by Federal officers and 
generally relied upon. 
Accordingly the agents thought there was "reasonable 
suspicion", they stopped respondent as he left the ticket 
counter, identified themselves, and asked if respondent had 
2. 
a moment to talk. Respondent replied affirmatively, and also 
agreed to show his airline ticket. The ticket bore the name 
"Holt", but when he also consented to show his driver's license, 
the name thereon was "Mark Royer". Respondent explained the 
discrepancy by saying that a friend had made the reservation in 
the name of "Holt". 
The officers then told respondent that they were Narcotics 
Investigators, and that they suspected respondent was transporting 
narcotics. Respondent agreed to accompany the officers some 40 
feet to a room in the Concourse used as the stewardesses lounge. 
The officers also used a ''large storage closet" (with a table and 
several chairs) to which they took suspects. Without any prior 
consent, the officers retrieved the suitcases, and with respondent's 
consent opened one of them with a key provided. The second one haa 
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a combination, respondent denied that he knew the combination, 
but agreed to its being forced open. It contained 60 pounds 
of marijuana. Respondent thereupon was arrested. 
At the suppression hearing, Johnst on testified as above 
stated. Respondent claimed that he had agreed to talk, to show 
his ticket and driver's license, and had accompanied the 
officers to the office only because he felt he had no choice. 
They were "police officers", and "I felt that's what I had to do". 
Trial Court 
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, stating: 
"[T]he Court believes that the consent was freely 
and voluntarily given. By the same token, I think 
under circumstances such as this where the police 
officers are in the airport and are surveilling, as 
testified to by the officer, with a specific profile 
that they are following, that the officer doesn't 
have the time to run out and get a search warrant 
because the plane is going to take off. If there 
is going to be anything occurring it's going to 
occur long before they can take any type of action. 
So it's a denial on dual grounds. Might as well 
get it tested whether it's reasonable or unreasonable 
because, I assume you are taking an appeal." 
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Florida Court of Appeals~~ 
A panel, one dissent, of the Florida District Court of 
Appeals affirmed. But on rehearing en bane, the panel decision 
was reversed, and the charges against respondent were ordered 
dismissed. 
The Court held (i) that respondent had been unlawfully 
restrained (seized) within the interrogation room, and that his 
"silent consent" to the search of his suitcase was involuntary; (ii) 
that there was no probable cause, and "and for all practical 
purposes, respondent had been placed under arrest when the 
alleged consent was given"; (iii) the consent was "tainted and 
invalid"; and (iv) the claim of exigent circumstances was 
irrelevant because this doctrine applies only to excuse the 
absence of a warrant, and does not justify arrest without --------probable cause. r-----
) 
It is particularly relevant to note the following statement 
by the Court of Appeals: 
"Since we hold that probable cause was required in 
this case and did not exist, we need not decide 
whether on this ground there was founded suspicion 
to justify stopping respondent" (Supplemental Appendix, 
p. 43). 
Florida v. Royer 
State's A~ument 
~ 
The State's principal argument is that e police act 
in "good faith'' - as seems to be conceded in this case - the 
exclusionary rule is not applicable. It relies heavily on 
Byron's view that a 1~ood faith exceptio~~ should be adopted, 
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a view Byron expressed at some length in his separate opinion 
in Stone v. Powell. In this case, Johns . on testified that the 
real deterrent against misconduct (unlawful arrest) by police 
officers is the ever present threat of a civil suit for damages, 
not the exclusionary rule. 
The State also relies on Justice Stewart's view in Mendenhall 
that a "stop" is valid when objectively, a reasonable person could 
conclude that he was free to walk away." Finally, the State 
argues that respondent freely consented to the search. 
I note here that respondent, in his brief, dismisses the 
"good faith'' issue as not having been presented below. The State 
has not yet filed a reply brief, but the opinion below did not 
address this issue. 
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SG' s Arguments 
In an amicus brief, the SG emphasizes the importance of 
the case and advances alternative arguments. On the basis of 
a preliminary reading, it i~?~ntirely clear to me which is the 
SG's principal argument. 
His basic argument appears to be that the Florida court 
~ 
failed to distinguish seizures that subject to the Fourth 
"' Amendment from "consensual police - citizen contacts that do 
not implicate the Fourth Amendment at all". Putting it 
differently, "an arrest requiring probable cause is to be 
distinguished from an investigative detention by reference to 
the purpose and duration of the detention, as well as the 
procedures which accompany it." (p. 11) 
Thus, as I understand it, the SG is agreeing with my 
analysis in Mendenhall where I concluded that there was a 
"seizure" (as there was no probable cause) but that for pur-
poses of investigation there may be a brief seizure on the 
basis of reasonable suspicion. 
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The SG made an alternative argument that there was no 
unlawful seizure at all, relying on Justice Stewart's opinion 
in Mendenhall to the effect that even without reasonable 
suspicion, police may stop a person for a brief interrogation, 
and that following such interrogation - in this case - there was 
consent to go to the private room, and consent thereafter to 
open the suitcase (as in M~ndenhall). See SG's brief p. 18 et seq./ 
particularly p. 21, quoting Justice Stewart. 
* * * 
Although I am not at rest in this case, I am inclined to 
think - as I did in Mendenhall - that there was a seizure but 
that there was reasonable suspicion justifying it; and thereafter, 
there was consent:r See my opinion in Mendenhall (446 u.s. at 560 




arguing that "a reasonable investigative stop does not offend the 
Fourth Amendment", and that reasonableness turns on the facts of 
each case. Our cases - as I mentioned - emphasize the public 
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interest served by the seizure, the nature and scope of the 
intrusion, and the objective facts upon which the law 
enforcement officers relied in light of their knowledge and 
expertise. 
I must agree that the court's per curiam in Reid v. Georgia 
(decided subsequently to tp Mendenhall, and in which I dissented) 
lends support to respondent's position. On the other hand, a 
/
great deal of language in Justige Stevens' more re~t  
~ Michigan v. Summers, decided June 22, 1981 (101 s.Ct. 2567). 
"' In that case, the Court held that where there was a warrant to 
- the front had searched ·II '• In the 
course of his opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized at length - citing 
Dunaway v. New York, 422 U.S. 200, that "some seizures are 
significantly less intrusive than an arrest", that "special 
enforcement problems" such as in Brignoni-Ponce" may justify the 
brief stopping of vehicles near the border. Justice Stevens then 
said: 
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"These cases recognize that some seizures admittedly 
covered by the Fourth Amendment constitute such limited 
intrusions on the personal security of those detained 
and are justified by such substantial law enforcement 
interests that they may be made on less than probable 
cause, so long as police have an articulable basis for 
suspecting criminal activity. In these cases, as in 
Dunaway, the Court was applying the ultimate standard of 
reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment. +hey 
are consistent with the general rule that every arrest, 
and every seizure having the essential attributes of a 
formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is supported 
by probable cause. But they demonstrate that the 
exception for limited intrusions that may be justified 
by special law enforcement interests is not confined to 
the monentary, on-the-street detention accompanied by a 
frisk for weapons involved in Terry and Adams. Therefore, 
in order to decide whether this case is controlled by the 
general rule, it is necessary to examine both the character 
of the official intrusion and its justification." 
------~~--------
3,~ IZ.Je__ ~~w.~. 
Questions Presented~ !;J;-~:Ir-zl.-t..... ~ 
~~l.tt.e-f ~.L'Aqr/p2.2. 
(1) Was there an "arrest," or a "seizure" short of a~ ' 
arrest, on the facts of the present case? 
(2) Does behavior consistent with the "drug courier pro-
file" constitute probable cause to justify an arrest, or articu-
lable suspicion sufficient to justify a more limited seizure? 
s~JJEA ?h~-)0/.$-
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I. Background 
A. The Drug Courier Profile 
During the early 1970s, when air piracy was a major 
problem, the Federal Aviation Administration and the commercial 
airlines developed a list of characteristics common to most sky-
jackers, and used this "profile" to identify potential skyjackers 
before they boarded the plane. 1 In 1974, a Detroit DEA agent 
developed a similar list of characteristics common to most drug 
couriers arrested in the Detroit airport. Versions of this "drug 
courier profile" are now used in airports throughout the country 
to help identify passengers who might be likely to be carrying 
drugs. Items on a list might include, for example, arrival or ~ 
departure from or to a narcotics "source" or "use" city, unusual~ 
~ki 
nervousness, carrying little or no baggage, purchasing airline 
tickets with cash, and making a telephone call immediately after 
deplaning. 
When police discover a person fulfilling several of the 
criteria on the list, they might decide to approach him/her and 
ask to see his/her airline ticket and some other identification. 
Their suspicions will be reinforced if the passenger is travel- ~ 
ling under an alias, has an unusual itinerary (such as a one-way 
ticket, or a rapid turnaround in a distant city), or has not 
checked any baggage. In such cases, the police might request 
1see, ~' United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 668-70 (CA2), 
c~. ~ed, 409 u.s. 991 (1972); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. 
S u pp. 1 0 7 7 , 1 0 8 4 , 1 0 8 6 ( E . D . N . Y . 19 71) . 
'"'":1.1· 
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permission to search the passenger. In most cases, the passenger 
consents to the search, and many searches reveal illegal drugs. 
~~- ~~~ 
B. Facts ~ ~ ~~jzM.i.d· 
The TC ~led to make any explicit factual findings in 
the present case. Since the state prevailed at trial, the appel-
late judges relied on the state's evidence in the record for 
their statements of the facts. The p~y J act§ are essentially -
undisputed. 2 Secondary facts may become relevant, however, de-
,..-- ----
pending on the Court's approach to the case, and the lack of fac-
tual findings may become troublesome. What follows is a summary 
of the undisputed facts. 71u.. 
~~ 
Two Dade County plainsclothes detectives, Officers John-~f:> 
son and Magdalena, were on duty at the Miami airport looking for J 
drug couriers. They first observed resp as he crossed the con- ~ 
course toward the National Airlines ticket counter with two 
He ~he~y laden suitcases manufactured by American Tourister. 
wa~nervous in appearance, looking around at other persons as 
though he might be looking for possibly police officers." Jt 
App, at 29A (quoted by CA en bane, 389 So.2d, at 1016). Johnson 
declared he could distinguish resp's behavior from the type of 
2There were only two witnesses at the suppression hearing: the 
defendant and one of the arresting officers. Their testimony 
conflicts on only one, minor point. See 389 So.2d, at 1009 n.3 
(CA panel majority). (The opinions of the lowe r-cotrr t s -ar e re-
produced in the petn app in typescript, but the typing is poor, 
and the opinions are difficult to read. I have therefore fol-
lowed the parties' practice and cited to the published version of tf 
I attach a copy for your convenience.) ~ ~ 
' \': ... 
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nervousness shown by "white knuckle flyers." Resp paid for his 
ticket to New York 3 in cash from a roll of small denomination 
bills. On the adhesive baggage tags furnished by the airline, he 
@ wrote only "Holt" and "LaGuardia" (his destination) rather than a 
full name, address, and telephone number. These actions were 
consistent with the officers' drug courier profile. 
The officers approached resp as he left the ticket 
counter, identified themselves, and asked if he had a moment to 
talk. He replied affirmatively. They asked to see his airline 
ticket, and he showed it to them. The~was in the name ~~ 
·~·" They asked for further identification, and he produce~ 
d n the name "Mark Ro.xer." To explain the dis- ~ 
crepancy, he claimed that a friend had made the airline reserva-
tion. The officers told him that they were narcotics investiga-
tors and that they suspected h . f . .~·~~ 1m o carry1ng narcot1cs. 
At this point, the officers asked resp to accompany them ~ 
.... .....,_,~ ~ 
feet from where they had approached ~ to a small room about forty 
him. They did not inform him that he was free to leave, although 
Johnson admitted that they then had no probable cause to justify 
an arrest. Resp nevertheless went with them. Using the baggage 
claim checks attached to the ticket, Johnson recovered resp's 
baggage from the airline without his consent. 4 The officers 
3The officers were particularly concerned with a National 
flight to Los Angeles. It seems that an LA destination would 
have fit the profile, but it is not clear if NY would, as well. 
4The officers may have recovered the bags after resp consented ~ 
to the search, but this is unclear. 
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asked to search the bags, but did not specifically inform him ~ 
that he had the right to refuse their request. He consented~ 
providing the key to one of the bags and allowing the other to be 
It '-\ 
forced open. They discovered sixty-five pounds of marijuana in ----------
the two bags, and officially arrested him. 
c. Decisions Below 
(1) The Trial Court. The TC, ruling from the bench, 
denied resp's motion to suppress the marijuana.s It held that 
resp's "consent was freely and voluntarily given," Jt App, at 
~-I 
115A, despite resp's testimony that he had consented to the vari-
ous police requests because "[t]hey were police officers and I 
thought I had to," e.g., Jt App, at 79A, BOA, 81A (quoted by CA 
panel, 389 So.2d, at 1009). Alternatively, the TC appeared to 
rely on an exigent circumstances exception, declaring "that the 
officer doesn't have the time to run out and get a search warrant 
because the plane is going to take off." Jt App, at llSA. 
(2) The District Court of Appeal Panel. A divided panel 
of the CA affirmed, holding that resp's consent had been volun-
tary. The majority concluded that resp had not been in custody, 
and that the officers had not coerced him. 389 So.2d, at 1010. 
The statement that they suspected him of carrying narcotics was 
not a threat but an explanation. Ibid. In any event, the fact 
that resp's behavior conformed to the profile gave the police 
5The TC's decision is reproduced in a footnote to the majority 
opinion of the CA panel. 389 So.2d, at 1008 n.l. 
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probable cause to arrest him. Id., at 1011-12. 
The majority agreed with the TC's alternative rationale, 
holding that a warrantless search of the luggage was justified (?~ 
without resp's consent. The profile evidence provided probable ~ 
cause, and his impending departure provided exigent circum- ~s~~ 
AJ_A ~ 
stances. Id., at 1012. United States v. Chadwick, 433 u.s. 1 ~~ 
~ (1977), was distinguished on the grounds that here "the defen- .; 
dant' s sui teases were immediately associated with him" because~ 
"he was in constructive possession thereof." 389 So.2d, at 1013. ~ 
Judge Schwartz dissented, arguing that (a) the offic~
effectively took resp into custody, thus placing him under arrest 
for purposes of constitutional analysis; (b) the arrest was ille-
gal because the officers, as Johnson admitted, did not have prob-
able cause justifying an arrest; 6 and (c) the consent was invalid 
since it was given while resp was illegally under arrest. Id., 
at 1014-15. He concluded that exigent circumstances could justi-
fy the lack of a warrant, but could not take the place of proba-
ble cause. Id., at 1015. 
(3) The District Court of Appeal En Bane. A unanimous 7~~ -
CA en bane reversed, holding that there had been an arrest with-~ 
.I 
The CA rea-~ 
~~ 
out probable cause, and this tainted resp's consent. 
6The dissent left open the possibility that the officers may ~~~ 
have been within their rights to "encounter" resp, or that they 
may have had the "founded suspicion" to justify a Terry stop. 
389 So.2d, at 1014. 
7The panel majority had consisted of two senior judges who were 
not entitled to sit on the en bane CA. 389 So.2d, at 1015 n.l. 
'' 
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soned that there had been an arrest because resp "found himself 
~
in a small enclosed area being confronted by two police 
officers," he knew he was a suspect in a narcotics investigation, 
and his plane ticket and luggage had been taken away from him. 
Under such circumstances, the CA concluded it was reasonable for 
resp to believe that he was not free to leave. Id., at 1018. 
The CA accepted Johnson's concession that the officers 
not had probable cause to make an arrest. The CA went beyond 
this, however, sayirig that "mere similarity with the contents of -..., 
the drug courier profile is insufficient even to constitute the 
articulable suspicion required to justify a Terry stop." Id., at 
1019. Relying on state authority, the CA completed its analysis 
with the conclusion that the illegal arrest necessarily tainted 
resp's consent. Id., at 1019-20. 
The CA, following the panel dissent, dismissed the exi-
gent circumstances argument. It held that exigent circumstances 
could justify the lack of a warrant, but could not take the place 
of probable cause. Id., at 1020. 
Judge Hubbart concurred separately. He agreed that pro 
file evidence, without more, could not constitute probable cause 
for an arrest. Ibid. He differed from the majority in arguing 
that profile evidence could constitute grounds for an investiga-
~ - ... -- -. 
.,
1 
.~t~e st~ . v{iting your opinion in United States v. Mendenhall, 
~- 446 u.s., at 560-66, he contended that the proper analysis re-
quired a balancing of (i) the public interest served by the stop; 
(ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion; and (iii) the objec-
tive facts upon which the officer relied. Id., at 1021-22. He 
felt that the public interest was very high, id., at 1023-24, and 
that the intrusion was generally very minor, id., at 1024. Thus 
each case would "turn on the nature of the profile behavior 
and the court's perception of how objectively suspicious the be-
havior in question seems to be." Id., at 1022. 
Judge Barkdull also concurred separately. He distin-
guished Mendenhall on the grounds that the officers did not re-
turn resp's plane ticket, and did not inform him that he could 
decline to consent. Id., at 1026. 
II. Discussion 
A. Exigent Circumstances ~f · . ~~ 
For convenience, l'~lfl~ f ~e3~ 
native rationale for admitt~h~ 1ei jed mlrijuana. Neither the 
state nor the amici stresses~e~t ~i!c~~r~,s 
but the CA panel endorsed the TC's reasoning, so I will briefly 
deal with it. To focus on the exigent circumstances aspect of 
the argument, I will assume for the moment that the officers had 
probable cause to search the bags without resp's consent. The 
validity of this assumption will be discussed below in part II.C. 
The governing principles were set out in Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 u.s. 753 (1979), and United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1 (1977). In both cases, the police had probable cause to 
8The state devotes a sentence (p. 46) to an exigent circum-
stances argument, citing two pre-Chadwick CA cases and two pre-
Chadwick law journal notes. 
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believe that certain luggage contained marijuana, so they arrest-
ed the owners and seized the luggage. It would have been possi-
ble to secure the luggage pending receipt of a search warrant. 
Moreover, there was no reason to believe that the bags were dan-
gerous, or that the evidence inside would lose its value if not 
discovered immediately. The police in each case nevertheless 
searched the luggage without a warrant. This Court held that 
both searches violated the Fourth Amendment. 
The present case is indistinguishable. Although resp 
would have departed with the luggage if it had not been seized, . ~ 
M~~~-~ 
that exigency (if such it is9) justifies at most a se ! zure. Once ~ 
1\. 
Johnson seized resp's bags, they were securely within his con-~ 
trol, and no further exigency justified an immediate search. Ab-
sent resp's consent, the proper course would have been to wait 
for a warrant. 
The CA panel ignored Sanders, but attempted to distin-
guish Chadwick on the grounds that the bags were "immediately 
associated with" resp. I find this distinction unpersuasive. 
During the relevant period, resp had no independent access to the 
bags. They were not even in his presence until Johnson brought 
9The extent of the "exigency" is questionable. Unlike Sanders 
and Chadwick, where the suspects were departing in automobiles, 
resp here was about to take a three-hour flight on a scheduled 
airline. The officers knew he would have no access to his lug-
gage until he reached the baggage claim area at LaGuardia. The 
airport smuggling details around the country are in regular con-
tact with each other. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 577 
F.2d 378, 379 (CA6 1978). A DEA agent could presumably have met 
resp in New York with a search warrant. 
t: 
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them there. The CA panel's suggestion that "he was in construe-
tive possession" of the bags (through the claim-checks) is also 
meritless: Johnson had taken the ticket with the claim-checks 
stapled to it, and had not returned it. But even if resp had 
retained the claim-checks, it would make little difference. He 
would still have had less access to his bags than did the resps 
in Chadwick prior to their arrest. 
B. Arrest, Seizure, or Consensual Encounter 
The first step in resp's anlaysis of the case requires a 
characterization of the contact between resp and the police. His 
argument depends on a finding that the intrusion was greater than 
could be justified by the officers' information at the time of 
the contact. In particular, he argues that the contact was an 
"arrest" which was not supported by "probable cause." He could 
similarly argue that the contact was a "seizure" which was not 
supported by "articulable suspicion." 
(1) The Legal Categories. The Court has clearly held 
that a confinement short of a formal arrest may be "indistin- ~~ 
guishable from a traditional arrest." Dunaway ' v. New Yorf: 442 
U.S. 200, 212 (1979). In Dunaway, for example, the police took a 
suspect into custody, drove him to police headquarters, gave him 
----------------, ~ 
the Miranda warnings, and questioned him for an hour. Although 
he was not formally arrested, the Court found the confinement to 
be the functional equivalent of a formal arrest and held that it 
must be supported by probable cause . 
. •' 
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The Court has also recognized that a person who has not 
been "arrested," because the intrusion is much less severe than a 
traditional arrest, may nevertheless be "seized" within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment. "[W]henever a police officer ac-
costs an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he 
has 'seized' that person." Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1, 16 (1968). 
Although a "seizure" does not require probable cause, it does 
require "an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity." 
To date, this exception to the traditional Fourth Amendment 
"probable cause" requirement has been narrowly construed. 10 
Finally, "not all personal intercourse between policemen 
and citizens involves 'seizure' of persons." Terry, supra, 392 
u.s., at 19 n.l6. Thus some contacts between police and citizens 
do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. As JUSTICE WHITE comment-
ed in Terry, "[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which pre-
vents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the 
streets." 392 u.s., at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). He went on 
to explain, "[o]f course, the person stopped is not obliged to 
answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer fur-
nishes no basis for an arrest .•.. " Ibid. The distinction be-
10see {ichigan v. Summers, 452 u.s. 692 (1981) (detention of 
home-owner while home searched pursuant to warrant); United 
States v. Cortez, 449 u.s. 411 (1981) (brief immigration check 
near border); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (order 
to leave car when car lawfully stopped, and weapons frisk on ba-
sis of reasonable suspicion); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 u.s. 873 (1975) (investigative stop near border lasting less 
than a minute for "a brief question or two"); Adams v. Williams, 
407 u.s. 143 (1972) (weapons "frisk" on basis of reasonable sus-
picion); Terry, supra (same). 
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tween a Fourth Amendment seizure and a consensual encounter rests 
on whether, "'in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the 
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not 
free to leave.'" Reid v. Georgia, 448 u.s. 438, 442 (1980) 
(opinion of POWELL, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. 
Mendenhall, supra, 446 u.s., at 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.)). 
(2) The Facts Here. The initial contact between resp 
and the police occurred when Johnson asked him if he had a moment 
to talk. At that point, no "seizure" had taken place. The easi-
e~solution of this case would be a finding that everything~ 
else happened with resp's consent. That is not what the TC ~ 
found, however, and the evidence on the record does not compel~ 
such a conclusion. If the case is remanded, of course, such a~ 
finding remains open to the TC. tc ~, 
uLL 
Assuming that resp did not voluntarily consent to 
followed, the next step is to determine whether a reasonable per~~ 
son in resp's pos~u~ h~ felt free to leave. I think~ 
not. Although you did not reach the seizure issue in Mendenhall, Ao· 
ou did say that the question was "extremely close." 446 u.s., ~ 
9 ~~t 560 n.l (Opinion of POWELL, J., concurring). Here the indicia~ 
~~ of seizure are significantly stronger. As in Mendenhall, resp 
accompanied the officers when requested to do so, apparently 
without verbal response, after he had been asked to show his 
plane ticket and driver's license. As in Mendenhall, the offi-
cers wore no uniforms, made no threats, and displayed no weapons. 
And as in Mendenhall, resp was not informed that he was free to 
refuse to cooperate • 
. 
i • I( 
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first significant difference is that Mendenhall's 
ticket and license had been returned to her immediately, before ----------------- -she was asked to accompany the DEA agents. The Court specifical-
ly relies on this fact, 446 u.s., at 558, and the dissent singles 
out the fact that the agents took her ticket and license "for ah 
time" as "an objective factor [ J that would tend to support a ~ 
'seizure' finding,"ll id., at 570 & n.3 (WHITE, J., dissenting). ~­
Here it is clear that the ticket was not returned to resp, and ~ 
appears that the license was simply placed with resp's other 
things after he empti~his pockets. 12 
~'1, 2.-
~he second significant difference is that resp's luggage 
was in the officers' possession, while Mendenhall was apparently 
travelling without luggage. A reasonable person would doubt his 
freedom to leave when the police are holding his bags. Even if --
did consider himself free to request the return of his bags, 
~~ t is unclear what he could have done with them. Most airlines 
~object when a passenger, having already checked two bags, at-
9 ~ tempts to check two bags a second time. -~ ~ 
(,/ In sum, I conclude that there was a "seizure," probably ~ 
when the officers, without returning resp's ticket and license, ~ 
11As JUSTICE WHITE noted, "[i]t is doubtful that any reasonable 
person about to board a plane would feel free to leave when law tt~ 
enforcement officers have her plane ticket." 446 U.S., at 570 ~ 
~ (White, J., dissenting). 
~he state suggests that resp was not required to empty his 
pockets until after his formal arrest. If this is true, the li-
cense was apparently not returned in time to make any difference 
on the seizure question. If resp had been required to empty his 
pockets earlier, on the other hand, that would be another indica-
tion that he had been seized before the formal arrest. 
J 
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/JA. ·~ • _. ,  ~ n~.,.(...{ ~ 
WI~ ''4.-1-~~~ 
or informing him of his right to refuse, asked resp to~bc;~~~~~ 
them to the office. Perhaps, though, the seizure occurred aft
they had obtained his luggage. If you agree that there was a 
seizure, however, it makes no difference which of these two 
points is selected as the time at which it was accomplished. 13 
I think the harder question is whether the seizure here 
was an "arrest." Prior to Michigan v. Summers, supra, I would 
_ -~~ave agreed with the CA without hesitation and concluded that 
~this case did present an arrest. Before Summers, the Court ~d 
~~~ ·~li~ited investigative stops to intrusions taking less than a~ 
~~~ e. In Summers, however, the Court upheld a much more intr~ 
~ t 'ention as a "seizure" short of an "arrest," primarily ~ 
~A......­
because the ~etention ~much les:_ i~trusive than the seizure  
~ Dunaway. Certainly on the spectrum from formal arrest to weapons 
frisk, this case falls nearer the latter. But as the Dunaway 
Court stressed, the general principle is that a seizure requires 
probable cause (i.e., is an arrest); the investigative stop based 
on reasonable suspicion is the narrow exception. If the excep-
tion becomes too broad, it will swallow the general principle. 
This case is near the line, but I would still be inclined to put , 
it on the "ar~ CJ.,;z., t1 ~? ~ 
In making this recommendation, I do not worry that it 
13Nothing of relevant legal significance took place in the in-
terim. Resp did not give his consent to the search then, and the 
officers learned nothing new that would help justify a seizure. 
The move from concourse to office may be relevant, but only in 
determining that a seizure took place. 
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would hobble the legitimate investigative activities of airport 
smuggling details that rely on the drug courier profile. 
Manua1 14 instructs the police in block capitals, "ALWAYS ADVISE 
THE SUSPECT THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO REFUSE TO CONSENT TO A 
--------------~~-----------------SEARCH." !d., at 61. It is only slightly less emphatic on ---ets and identification: "Return ticket and/or ID immediately." 
Id., at 129 (emphasis in original). If the officers here had 
followed these instructions by returning resp's ticket and li-
cense immediately, and if they had not recovered his luggage un-
til he had given his permission, then this would be essentially 
the same close case as Mendenhall. And if they had also informed 
him that they sought his voluntary cooperation, which he had the 
right to refuse, it would not even be a close case. The DEA, in 
preparing the Manual, obviously finds these constraints reason-
J?li/1-~~- -*" 
able. I see no reason why the ~~t should not endorse them. Ur f~5 
a suspect's holding his ticket and knowing his rights would be 
enough to hobble the procedure, the procedure relies not on vol-
untary cooperation but on fear and ignorance. 
C. Probable Cause or Articulable Suspicion 
(1) The Profile Per Se. There has been considerable 
controversy about the drug courier profile, 
assumption that the profile is designed to objectively /predi~\ 
14Legal Problems in Airport Interceptions of Domestic Drug Cou-
riers (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, 
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who is likely to be a drug courier. 15 The assumption is invalid, 
however, for the profile neither is nor is intended to be any-
~
thing more than an investigative tool. 
As a practical matter, the drug courier profile is high-
ly subjective. One district judge described it as "chameleon-
like," observing that "it seems to change itself to fit the facts 
of each case." United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. 
Supp. 690, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). In United States v. Chamblis, 
425 F. Supp. 1330, 1333 (E.D. Mich. 1977), a DEA agent "testified 
that the profile in a particular case consists of anything that 
arouses his suspicions." 
A few comparisons illustrate these concerns. In Menden-
hall, the first three factors on which the agents relied to de-
termine that the suspect fit the profile were (1) her arrival 
from Los Angeles, a "source" city: (2) the fact that she was the 
last to leave the plane, and appeared very nervous: and (3) her 
failure to have any baggage. 446 u.s., at 547 n.l. On the first 
factor, the court in United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 566-
67 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 878 (1979), commented, "our ex-
perience with DEA agent testimony ... makes us wonder whether 
there exists any city in the country which a DEA agent will not 
15see, e.g., Goldstein & Hirschhorn, Drug Courier Profiles (A 
MarlU)nnian Nightmare) (Nat'l Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers, Criminal Defense Seminar, 1981): Bodine, Selecting Drug 
'Suspects': Use of Courier Profile At u.s. Airports Lands DEA in 
Controversy, Nat'l L.J., July 27, 1981, at 1: Costantino, Drug 
Courier Profiles and Airport Stops: Is the Sky the Limit?, 3 
Western New England L. Rev. 175 (1980). 
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characterize as either a major narcotics distribution center or a 
city through which drug couriers pass on their way to a major 
narcotics distribution center."l6 
On the second factor, United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 
1161, 1164 {CAS), cert. denied, 102 s.ct. 292 {1981), is instruc-
tive. There the agents relied on the fact that the suspect "was 
one of the first passengers to deplane." Even nervousness, which 
is inherently subjective, is not part of every profile. In Unit-
ed States v. Hirnrnelwright, SSl F.2d 991, 992 n.l {CAS), cert. 
denied, 434 u.s. 902 {1977) {border search), an agent's suspi-
cions were aroused because the suspect was "extremely calm." 
And on the third factor, the present case is noteworthy. 
Resp was an object of suspicion not because he had no baggage, or 
.______/ very little baggage, but because he was "carrying two apparently 
b S' ~ heavily-laden suitcases." 389 So.2d, at 1016. 
This subjectivity should not be surprising, for the pro-
file is not designed to be anything more than an investigative 
tool. The DEA analogizes agents identifying couriers with a pro--file to other professionals making professional decisions with 
the aid of "an informal mental checklist" of relevant factors: 
[A doctor], for example, in making a diagnosis, must 
compare the patient's symptoms to a mental checklist of 
characteristics which he knows indicate certain dis-
eases. He probably learned that checklist originally 
in medical school and has modified it over the years 
16cf. United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d llSl, llSS n.l {CAS 
1980) {"A review of the cases in which this profile has been 
used, as well as the direct testimony of [a DEA agent], convinces 
us of the tragic fact that every major population center in this 
country has become a horne for drug traffickers."). 
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-
from his own experience and that of fellow doctors •••• 
DEA Manual, at 149. The analogy strikes me as relevant. A doc-
tor cannot decide to operate solely on the basis of a few symp-
toms unless those symptoms are highly probative, but he can use a 
list of symptoms as an aid to exercising his independent profes-
sional judgment. The legitimacy of the decision depends not on 
the existence of a few symptoms, but on the quality of the doc-
tor's judgment in the overall circumstances. The same is true 
for seizures based on "profile evidence." As the DEA reminds its 
agents, "Reasonable Suspicion will be established by what is in 
your head, not what may be written on paper somewhere." Id., at 
152. There is nothing wrong with using a profile, but its limi-
tations must be recognized--both by the agents in the field and 
by the courts. Whether there was probable cause or articulable 
suspicion should be determined using the traditional analysis, 
regardless of what legitimate investigative tools the 
used to develop their suspicions. 
(2) The Facts Here. At the time resp was seized, John-
son and Magdalena knew the following: (1) Resp was nervous, ap-
parently seeking to avoid detection. (2) Resp was travelling 
from Miami to New York on a one-way ticket purchased with cash. 
(3) Resp had two heavily laden American Tourister suitcases. 
CJ_., @ Resp was t : avelling ~~;r a @ Not only was his ticket 
~r in the name "Holt," but he had identified his luggage with the 
~~name "Holt." @ Resp did not put an address or telephone number 
on~age. It would have been better, of course, if the TC 
~ had found that these circumstances either did or did not consti-
f.;·, 
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fLth~~ 
. b~ bb tute art1cula le susp1c1on or pro a le cause. On 
~ 
theba~~J 
not have proba- L-
at 57A), but ~ 
the record, though, I feel that the officers did 
ble cause (a fact that Johnson conceded, Jt app, 
that they did have reasonable suspicion. 
--==- =-===--_....,., z<"P : a:::r ow~ 
Standing alone, none of the factors is overwhelming, but 
most have some probabative value. I think an experienced officer 
can tell the difference between "white knuckle flyer" nervousness 
and wrongdoer nervousness, but the courts should require him to 
articulate his specific findings in each case. That seems to 
have been done here. 17 The second factor strikes me as less im-
portant. It is not unusual for a student attending college in 
New York to buy a one-way ticket to New York City near the end of 
the Christmas ~ion. Paying with cash is not surprising. 
/ 
Many college students do not have the credit rating to justify a 
credit card. Furthermore, the Miami-New York airfare was not 
very high at the time. The third factor also fails to impress 
me. Whenever I went back to college .after a vacation, my bags (:,5" ~ 
< 
were packed to the limit, and I was not alone in this regard. I 
am also not unusual in my use of American Tourister luggage. The 
~~ ,1 
fourth fac tpr is the most persuasive for me. ,..... ~ It was clear that 
~L \\. 
The fifth factor 
also carries some weight. While many people do not wish to dis-
play their address and telephone number, they at least have bag-
17Johnson testified to his experience, and explained that resp 
was nervously looking around the area as though trying to spot 
policemen. "White knuckle flyers" generally fidget and talk to 
one another uneasily. Jt app, at 30A-31A. 
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gage tags that allow the information to be obtained if necessary. 
Resp obviously did not want his ownership of the bags established I 
if they fell into official hands. 
My biggest trouble with this evidence is its lack of 
specificity. Resp was doing something that he did not want to 
publicize, but it is not clear that he was doing anything ille-
gal, and even less clear that he was carrying narcotics. In 1978 
(the most recent year for which statistics are provided) , the 
LaGuardia Airport Unit made 43 searches. On 16 occasions the 
unit seized drugs, but on 13 occasions they discovered illegal 
aliens. DEA Manual, at 2. 18 Drug-running is not the only activ-
ity that travelers wish to keep secret. The stereotypical adul-
terer using a commercial airline to travel to a distant rendez- ? 
vous would fit the drug courier profile perfectly. 
The lack of specificity convinces me that Johnson was 
correct to admit that he had no probable cause to arrest resp. 
Articulable suspicion is a closer question. In Mendenhall, you 
analyzed the problem using a three-part test which examined 
( i) the public interest served by the seizure, ( i i) the 
nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the objec-
tive facts upon which the law enforcement officer re-
lied in light of his knowledge and expertise. 
446 u.s., at 561. Here the first two factors are essentially the 
same as in Mendenhall and Reid v. Georgia, supra, so in comparing 
18cf. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 534 n.lO (CA5 1980) 
(2~of searches at Atlanta Airport during 7 months in 1977 pro-
duced evidence of criminal activity other than transporting nar-
cotics) . 
> • ... 
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the cases the th' d factor is determinative. The officers here 
had less basis for suspicion than the agents in Mendenhall. Resp 
was no more nervous than Mendenhall, his itinerary was less sus-
picious, his heavy luggage was less suspicious than her lack of 
luggage, and they both travelled under an alias. On the other 
hand, they probably had more basis for suspicion than the agents 
in Reid. There the suspects were apparently travelling under 
their own names on tickets purchased with a credit card. Their 
itinerary and airport behavior, however, were more suspicious 
than resp's. In the end this is a judgment call. I would say 
that the officers here had reasonable suspicion. 
~---~ --. 
D. The Exclusionary Rule 
If there was an "arrest" without probable cause, or a 
"seizure" without articulable suspicion, then it is necessary to 
consider the exclusionary rule. I am inclined to think that the 
Constitution does not require exclusion of the marijuana simply 
because resp's consent to search his bags was given while he was 
in illegal custody. Suppression may be required when the custody 
does in fact influence the consent, but the court below applied 
what amounts to a per se rule. Although such a rule makes sense 
when the illegal arrest is the justification for the search, that 
is not the case here. Even a valid arrest, standing alone, could 
not have justified searching resp's locked suitcases. Here the 
CA did not give the state the opportunity to prove that the con-
sent was voluntary in the totality of the circumstances despite 
the illegality of the arrest. I do not think that Brown v. Illi-
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nois, 422 u.s. 590 (1975), and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471 (1963), or the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary 
rule, requires such a result. 
issue. 
lent is 
This may, however, be strictly a state constitutional 
Unlike the federal exclusionary rule, the Florida equiva-~ · 
explicit in Article 1, §12 of the state constitution. ~ · 
While the Florida courts accept the federal standards for deter-
mining whether a search, seizure, or arrest is reasonable, Flori-
da v. Hetland, 366 So.2d 831 (Fla. App. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 
387 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1980), their exclusionary rule appears to be 
more limited. In applying the exclusionary rule, the court below 
relied directly on Florida cases, and the courts in those cases, ~ 
in turn, relied on earlier Florida cases. Since this looks lik~ 
a strictly state question, I do not discuss the federal issue in ~ 
detail here. If you would find it helpful, however, I will be 
happy to do so. 
The state argues extensively for a good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule. Resp argues that this was not raised 
below, so it may not be available here. In any event, it seems 
that the Florida constitution would not permit such a result, 
even if this Court relaxed the federal rule. Once again, I do 
not discuss this issue in detail, but will be happy to do so if 
you would find it helpful.l9 
19 In tying up loose ends, please note that I have also not dealt 
with resp's mootness argument. It looks like a narrow issue, but 
I would like to see the state's reply before discussing it. 
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III. Conclusion r:t~ 
This is a complicated case, with many of the complica-
tions arising out of the TC's failure to make explicit findings 
on issues that may prove relevant. To resolve the case, it is 
necessary to make two close judgment calls that may end up being 
closely bound to these facts. On the~, I conclude there was 
at least a "seizure," and that seizure might be an "arrest." On 
the~~ I conclude the officers did not have probable cause 
to make an arrest, but they did have articulable suspicion suffi-
cient to justify a limited seizure. If the case is to have any 
broad precedential value, it will probably be in its treatment of 
the drug courier profile. On that issue, I recommend that the 
Court treat it as a legitimate investigative tool, but evaluate~ 
the agents' independent judgments in the traditional way. The ~ 
extreme approach of the en bane CA is inappropriate, and the op---
~ 
posite extreme of the CA panel is even worse. In some case pro-
file evidence will be sufficient, and in others it will not. ~ 
Each case must be judged on its facts • 
. . 
